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I. INTRODUCTION
Few subjects are as emotionally troubling as AIDS' and rape. The
latter, of course, has plagued society throughout human history, but
AIDS only recently has imposed itself upon our social and medical con-
sciousness. Ever since AIDS became a familiar sight in the headlines
nearly ten years ago,2 society has reacted to it with a mixture of anxi-
1. AIDS is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. BLACK'S MEDICAL Dic-
IONARY 18 (35th ed. 1987).
2. AIDS first began to gain attention in this country in the early 1980s when clusters of
otherwise healthy young homosexual men began to exhibit symptoms of Kaposi's sarcoma. Sicldick
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ety, confusion, and despair. One consequence of the new societal aware-
ness is the increased hesitancy with which individuals approach
intimate contact. When intimate contact is involuntary as in the case of
rape, fear of exposure to the disease is especially pronounced. Society,
however, seems ill-prepared to address rationally and uniformly the
special problems faced by victims who fear they may have contracted
AIDS as the result of rape.
Given the fear surrounding AIDS, calls to test certain groups of
people for evidence of the AIDS virus were inevitable.3 Responding to
pleas from rape victims and victims' rights advocates, a number of
states have enacted mandatory AIDS testing programs for sexual of-
fenders, sometimes as part of comprehensive AIDS legislation pack-
ages.4 Mandatory testing programs have proven problematic, however,
because they often fail to provide for the defendant's interests, which
can include such concerns as confidentiality, privacy, and presumption
of innocence. A definite tension arises in pitting the victim's interests
against the defendant's rights and in deciding whose concerns should
take precedence.' No one has presented a uniform resolution to this
question. Various approaches adopted by state legislatures reflect in-
consistencies in dealing with the problem.'
With Proposition 96 California has adopted an administrative
scheme that seeks to regulate mandatory human immunodeficiency vi-
rus (HIV) testing for accused sex offenders.7 Commentators have
& Rubenstein, A Medical Review of AIDS, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 6 (1985). Kaposi's sarcoma is a
type of malignant skin lesion not normally found in young individuals; it was aggressively malig-
nant in these early AIDS patients. Id. at 5; Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic (June 1988) [hereinafter Presidential Commission].
3. Branham, Opening the Bloodgates: The Blood Testing of Prisoners for the AIDS Virus,
20 CONN. L. REv. 763, 763-64 (1988). In response to demands for legal and political solutions to the
AIDS epidemic, various lawmakers have suggested that prostitutes and prisoners, Note,
Mandatory AIDS Testing: The Slow Death of Fourth Amendment Protection?, 20 PAc. L.J. 1413,
1413 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing], couples applying for marriage licenses,
Chaski, Bagby, Northrup & Harmon, The Missouri AIDS Law: A Public Health Perspective, 53
Mo. L. REv. 643 (1988), and immigrants and illegal aliens applying for amnesty, Barnes, AIDS and
Mr. Korematsu: Minorities at Times of Crisis, 7 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 35 (1988), be among the
groups mandatorily screened for AIDS.
4. See Hoffman, AIDS and Rape: Should New York Test Sex Offenders?, VILLAGE VOIcE,
Sept. 12, 1989, at 35. As of September 1989, at least 18 states had adopted legislation that man-
dates AIDS testing of sex offenders. Id. at 36. Among states having some form of mandatory AIDS
testing of sex offenders are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada,
Rhode Island, and Washington. See id. at 38.
5. Id. at 38.
6. See infra notes 165-203 and accompanying text.
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.95-199.99 (West Supp. 1990). The terms "AIDS test-
ing" and "HIV testing" commonly are used interchangeably although neither precisely describes
the actual procedure. See infra notes 15-20 and 38-44 and accompanying text.
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praised the California statute as an effective approach to the problem.8
Critics, however, remain skeptical that the statute adequately will pro-
tect the rights of the defendant."
By passing a strict confidentiality law New York has placed itself
in clear opposition to those states that have adopted mandatory testing
programs for sex offenders. The "New York law, with certain exceptions,
requires that no one may be tested for AIDS without providing in-
formed consent. 10 Because both New York and California bear the bur-
den of a high AIDS rate," the controversy surrounding these laws may
have a broad national impact.
This Note examines the issues surrounding mandatory AIDS
screening of sex offenders and some of the contrasting approaches to
the problem with an emphasis on the legislative reactions to the contro-
versy in New York and California. Part II provides a brief medical
background of the AIDS epidemic. Part III examines the current effi-
cacy of AIDS screening, the state of which makes mandatory testing a
troublesome proposition. Part IV explores the fourth amendment re-
quirements that, if met, justify a governmental intrusion on an individ-
ual's physical privacy. Parts V and VI, respectively, will consider two
approaches to the involuntary testing issue: California's Proposition 96
and New York's AIDS Testing and Confidentiality Law. Finally, Part
VII will examine the difficult balance that must be struck between the
rape victim's interests and the defendant's legal rights.
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
By December 1986 an estimated 16,000 individuals had died from
AIDS.'2 The AIDS death toll is expected to approach 180,000 by 1991,13
and as of April 1989 more than 88,000 cases of AIDS had been reported
nationally to the Centers for Disease Control. 4 The force underlying
the AIDS epidemic is the insidious spread of HIV infection.15 The HIV
retrovirus6 preys on the body's immune system, eventually leaving the
8. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 39.
9. Id.
10. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-2787 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
11. See Mueller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 14
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 250, 254 (Table 2) (1986).
12. This figure was deemed to be low at the time due to a low reporting rate. Merritt, Com-
municable Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739, 742 n.9
(1986).
13. Id. at 742.
14. Joint Subcomm. on AIDS in the Criminal Justice System, Bar of City of N.Y., AIDS and
the Criminal Justice System: Executive Summary of the Final Report, 44 RECORD OF AssOCIATION
OF BAR OF CITY OF N.Y., 601, 609 (1989) [hereinafter Executive Summary].
15. Mueller, supra note 11, at 252.
16. A retrovirus incorporates its genetic material into the host cell's DNA structure and
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individual vulnerable to a host of opportunistic infections and ill-
nesses 17 that normal, healthy individuals are able to resist.18
As the acronym indicates, AIDS is a syndrome: as such, it cannot
be tied to a single medical condition. It is helpful to think of AIDS as a
wide spectrum of HIV-related conditions ranging from simple HIV in-
fection in an otherwise healthy individual, to recurrent nonopportunis-
tic infections, to the presence of one or more "indicator" illnesses,
which are the hallmark of full-blown AIDS as currently defined. 9 In
reality, dealing with AIDS means that the medical community must
consider two distinct epidemics: a visible "body count" of diagnosed
AIDS cases and an invisible dispersion of HIV infections to infectious,
but still relatively healthy, individuals.20
The passage of time connects the two epidemics, and the time link
between the two, while uncertain, appears to be a lengthy one.21 Origi-
nally, researchers underestimated the average time between HIV infec-
tion and the appearance of AIDS symptoms. 22 Recent investigation
reveals that HIV's average latency period is at least 4.5 years and may
be as long as a decade.2 3 The disease's unpredictable progression inevi-
tably creates problems in terms of testing for HIV and controlling its
spread.24
As the illness progresses, the individual acquires more infections
causes the cell to replicate the virus instead of performing normal cellular functions. Note, Consti-
tutional Questions: Mandatory Testing for AIDS Under Washington's AIDS Legislation, 24
GoNz. L. REV. 433, 437 (1988-89) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Questions].
17. Opportunistic infections are those that occur when the host individual's physiological
state is altered or weakened. Certain antibiotics and viruses, such as HIV, may transform the
body's immune system so that "certain microorganisms which would otherwise be nonpathogenic
become pathogenic." Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 8 n.27 (quoting C. TABER, TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 0-19 (13th ed. 1977)).
18. Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 604. AIDS victims are susceptible to many oppor-
tunistic diseases, including various forms of pneumonia and cancer. See Mueller, supra note 11, at
250. Evidence suggests that HIV infection also is linked to disorders of the central nervous system
that may cause a variety of degenerative neurological conditions. Executive Summary, supra note
14, at 604.
19. Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 6. Those HIV-related diseases that are not classi-
fiable as full-blown AIDS are identified as part of AIDS-related complex (ARC). Id.; Executive
Summary, supra note 14, at 607.
20. Mueller, supra note 11, at 250. Early studies suggested that less than 20% of HIV-in-
fected individuals would develop full-blown AIDS, but more recent investigation has shown that
an increasing proportion of people with HIV infection eventually develop the symptomatic disease.
Merritt, supra note 12, at 742; Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 607.
21. Mueller, supra note 11, at 250.
22. Id. at 254.
23. Id. at 250, 254. Other research indicates that 35% of HIV-infected individuals will ex-
hibit AIDS symptoms within six years and suggests that over time this figure will approach 100%.
Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 607 (citing Presidential Commission, supra note 2, at 8).
24. See infra notes 38-91 and accompanying text.
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and increasingly becomes debilitated.25 At present, no known cure for
AIDS exists. Very few of those with AIDS survive beyond two years
after diagnosis. 26 Most research devoted to finding a cure centers
around efforts to boost the infected individual's immune system and to
discover an effective antiviral agent to combat HIV.27 Thus far, effec-
tive remedies have eluded researchers, 28 and AIDS patients generally
fall victim to the lethal, opportunistic infections that flourish in immu-
nodeficient individuals.29
HIV has been discovered in blood, semen, vaginal fluids, tears, and
saliva.30 HIV causes an infection of low transmissibility, which means
that transmission of the virus generally requires intimate sexual con-
tact, direct exposure to infected blood, or perinatal exposure.31 Doctors
and public health officials emphasize that the disease is not spread
through casual contact.3 2 HIV transmission through means other than
sexual, perinatal, or invasive blood exposure is, therefore, very low.33
AIDS occurs primarily among homosexual and bisexual men.3 4 In-
travenous drug abusers compose the second predominant group of indi-
viduals at high risk for HIV infection. 5 Recently, HIV infection has
appeared in increasing numbers of individuals outside of these two
populations. Evidence suggests that individuals who have heterosexual
contact with members of high-risk groups also risk infection. 6
Hemophiliacs and other persons receiving blood transfusions after 1977,
children born to a high-risk parent, and persons born in certain high-
risk countries also have been categorized as separate risk groups since
25. Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 8.
26. Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 609. One study has shown that only 13% of diag-
nosed AIDS patients survive for at least two years after diagnosis. Id.
27. Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 10.
28. The Food and Drug Administration has authorized limited distribution of
azidothymidine (AZT), a drug that seems to prolong the lives of some AIDS patients. Merritt,
supra note 12, at 745. AZT, however, is not a cure for AIDS, id., and actually has some serious side
effects. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 39; see also infra note 220.
29. Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 8-9.
30. Mueller, supra note 11, at 256. Epidemiological evidence indicates that tears and saliva
may not be "important" sources of HIV. Id.
31. Id. Some authorities have suggested that breast milk also may be a viable source of HIV.
Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 8 & n.24. More research on mother-child infection is
needed, but studies have shown that HIV transmission has occurred during the first few postnatal
months. In this scenario, breast feeding is the most probable mechanism of contagion. Merritt,
supra note 12, at 748.
32. Merritt, supra note 12, at 751. Professor Merritt notes that the Surgeon General has
emphasized that "[y]ou cannot get AIDS from casual... contact." Id. at 751 n.54 (emphasis in
original).
33. Mueller, supra note 11, at 256.
34. Id. at 251.
35. Id.
36. Merritt, supra note 12, at 751; Mueller, supra note 11, at 251.
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the epidemic began in the early 1980s.31
III. AIDS TESTING
Prior to 1984 only nonspecific clinical and immunological tests were
used to diagnose AIDS." Current HIV screening tests determine
whether an individual has antibodies39 to HIV produced by the immune
system in response to the presence of viral protein components. 40 Ser-
oconversion, the process by which the immune system produces these
antibodies, generally occurs within three months of HIV infection.41
One may not assume accurately, however, that a person is free of HIV
infection simply because HIV antibodies are not present.42 Certain indi-
viduals do not develop antibodies for a year or more, and inexplicably,
some asymptomatic persons may not develop them at all.4' The absence
of HIV antibodies, therefore, does not guarantee the absence of HIV
infection."
Conversely, the present HIV tests do not indicate the actual pres-
ence of HIV-related disease, but only can document exposure to the
virus itself. 45 As of yet, researchers have not developed a test intended
for mass screening that will indicate with certainty whether an individ-
ual has HIV and is infectious. 46 A majority of high-risk individuals who
have undergone seroconversion are found to have culturable HIV and,
therefore, must be assumed capable of infecting others.41 In any event,
a complete physical examination and detailed evaluation of an individ-
ual's immune system are necessary before a definitive AIDS diagnosis
can be made.45
37. Mueller, supra note 11, at 251; Wright, AIDS: A Brief Overview, 12 NOVA L. REv. 973,
975 (1988).
38. Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 9. These tests included assays to establish the
ratio of helper to suppressor cells within an individual's immune system. Id. at 9 n.28. This infor-
mation served as a general indicator of the health of the individual's immune system, but did not
indicate specifically that the individual was infected with HIV because a similar ratio is often
found in minor respiratory and HIV infections. Id. Thus, the assay was discarded as an HIV test.
Id.
39. Antibodies are produced during a viral infection in an attempt to combat or at least to
neutralize the invasion. Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 606.
40. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, Screening for HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits, and the Burden
of Proof, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 260 (1986).




45. Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 9; see also Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note
40, at 260.
46. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260.
47. Id.
48. Sicklick & Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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A number of serum antibody tests are used to indicate the likeli-
hood of HIV infection.49 The most common initial screening mechanism
is the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), also called enzyme
immunoassay (EIA), which is a standardized commercial product.50 Re-
searchers originally developed the ELISA test to screen large quantities
of blood products for HIV.5 1 Designed to be expedient, the test is per-
formed quickly and easily.52 Additional antibody tests, such as the
Western blot assay, are not as practical as ELISA for screening pur-
poses; instead, these tests are used exclusively to confirm positive
ELISA results. 53 When an ELISA is positive, standard testing protocol
requires that the test be repeated; if the ELISA is still positive, the
confirmatory test will be performed. 4
A. ELISA Test Procedures
In ELISA technicians apply a blood sample to cultured HIV pro-
tein material and then add a reagent designed to detect the presence of
HIV antibodies. 5 A spectrophotometer measures the change in the rea-
gent's color:5 6 the greater the color change, the higher the level of HIV
antibodies produced in the blood in response to the viral proteins.5 7 Be-
cause the test results are measured on a spectrum instead of simply
identifying the presence or absence of antibodies, the technicians must
decide which values on the scale constitute a positive test result and
which are negative.5 8 Obviously, the selected cutpoint will have a great
impact on the relative numbers of positive and negative results 19 and,
therefore, the number of repeat tests that will be necessary.
49. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260.
50. Id.; see also Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 440.
51. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260.
52. Id. For blood supply screening purposes, rejecting all blood that tests positive for HIV is
undoubtedly a good practice because no harm can come of discarding some "good blood" in the
interest of safety. Thomas, The Perils of AIDS Testing, 40 LA LAW. 39, 41 (Sept. 1988). The
impact of a false positive is far more serious when ELISA is utilized for HIV diagnostic purposes.
53. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260. The Western blot test is labor intensive
and, therefore, not as efficient in terms of time and expense as ELISA. See id.
54. Thomas, supra note 52, at 41.
55. Id.; Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260.
56. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260; Thomas, supra note 52, at 41.
57. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260; Thomas, supra note 52, at 41.
58. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260.
59. Id. ELISA was a great success as the initial screening agent for the Nation's blood and
blood-product supply precisely because of its variable cutpoint. Since the goal was to eliminate all
suspicious units from the blood supply, a very low cutpoint served to screen out all blood that
exhibited even the slightest possibility of HIV infection. See Thomas, supra note 52, at 41.
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B. Western Blot Test Procedures
To confirm a double positive ELISA using a Western blot test, cul-
tured HIV is broken down into its protein components and blotted onto
special paper.60 After technicians add a sample of HIV suspect blood,
the paper is treated with a radioactive isotope and exposed to x-ray
film. 1 "Hotspots" on the film indicate the presence of antibodies to
separate HIV protein components.2 The Western blot test is more spe-
cific in its findings than is ELISA. The Western blot is not a commer-
cially manufactured product and, therefore, differs from ELISA in that
its performance may vary to some degree in different laboratory set-
tings. 3 Notwithstanding this difference, the Western blot test generally
is recognized as the most sensitive test for HIV antibodies. 4
C. The Reliability of AIDS Testing
In general, Americans wholeheartedly embrace the concept of labo-
ratory testing. Ours is a testing culture that often uses diagnostic proce-
dures as a barometer of an individual's health. 5 Individuals frequently
rely on laboratory tests without questioning the authenticity of the
results.66
Unfortunately, no screening or diagnostic test is perfectly reliable:
every test has limited precision and accuracy, and neither ELISA nor
the Western blot test is an exception.67 Both tests, at various times,
have failed to identify individuals infected with HIV, thus providing
false negative results, and both have mistakenly labeled uninfected in-
dividuals as HIV carriers, thus providing false positive results. 8 In the
short time that these two HIV tests have been in use,6 ' both have
demonstrated relatively high rates of sensitivity on occasion.70 These
60. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260. The various protein components sepa-
rate into bands on the paper. Id.
61. Id.; Thomas, supra note 52, at 40.
62. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 260.
63. Id.
64. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 441.
65. Thomas, supra note 52, at 40.
66. Id.
67. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 261; Note, Constitutional Questions, supra
note 16, at 441. Precision refers to a test's ability to provide consistent results when conducted
repeatedly under similar circumstances. Even minor environmental and procedural factors can af-
fect a tests precision. Accuracy, sometimes referred to as validity, is the extent to which a test
actually exhibits the disorder it is intended to detect and no other condition. Barry, Cleary &
Fineberg, supra note 40, at 261.
68. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 441.
69. As of September 1988 ELISA and the Western blot test had been in general use for HIV
antibody screening for approximately three years. See Thomas, supra note 52, at 40.
70. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 441.
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results, however, have been observed only when the tests are conducted
under optimal laboratory conditions, 71 which are understandably un-
common in the average laboratory environment.
Some inaccurate test results are due to laboratory error, which may
result from procedural inexperience or simple overwork.7 2 Individual bi-
ological factors also can cause erroneous ELISA tests." As a result, con-
ducting a confirmatory Western blot test is important. On the other
hand, the Western blot test is itself subject to erroneous readings be-
cause of the highly subjective nature of its interpretation.7 1 Conse-
quently, the Western blot test returns a relatively significant number of
"indeterminate" results." The impact of such a reading may be devas-
tating. An individual unfortunate enough to have a positive ELISA re-
sult and an inconclusive Western blot reading would be subject to
considerable mental strain and anguish.76
In addition, the tests may be ineffective in screening HIV-infected
individuals, not because the tests are faulty, but because of the condi-
tion of the blood under examination. For example, the screening tests
are generally more accurate when applied to persons suffering from a
more advanced state of disease.77 As previously noted, several weeks or
even months may pass before an HIV-infected person develops antibo-
dies to the virus, and some persons may never develop any at all.", This
"window" between HIV infection and seropositivity represents a time
in which an individual will test negative for HIV but still be infectious.
HIV tests conducted at this early stage of infection, therefore, nearly
always will yield a false negative result. Unfortunately, a laboratory has
no way of identifying and distinguishing ELISA false negatives from
71. Id. at 441-42.
72. Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 52, at 41-42.
73. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 441. As discussed in Part III(A), supra,
ELISA is conducted with cultured viral components. Current methods of culturing virus do not
allow for complete purification; therefore, the initial viral material also contains certain other cel-
lular proteins, carbohydrates, and antigens. Thomas, supra note 52, at 41; Note, Constitutional
Questions, supra note 16, at 442. If by chance the tested blood serum contains antibodies to these
other viral components, ELISA will read this reaction as confirming the presence of HIV antibo-
dies, thus producing a false positive test result. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at
442.
74. Thomas, supra note 52, at 41. Due to a lack of experience in using the Western blot test
and the absence of accepted national standards, the medical community has not settled upon a
regularized method of reading the test to confirm a positive ELISA result. Id.; Note, Constitu-
tional Questions, supra note 16, at 443.
75. Thomas, supra note 52, at 41.
76. See id.
77. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 261.




truly negative test results79 because negative results rarely are subjected
to confirmation via one of the more sensitive test procedures.
Judging the effectiveness and the consequences of mandatory
screening tests is clearly a complicated and technical process.8 0 Some
authorities contend that testing large segments of low-risk groups will
result in an abnormally high rate of false positives."' Conversely, false
negative test results are often a major problem in screening members of
high-risk populations.8 2 In any event, the tests presently employed have
some potential for error. Mandatory screening of a substantial number
of subjects necessarily amplifies the errors inherent in the tests. Unfor-
tunately, the tests and the dissemination of the results to "interested"
parties can have an enormously harmful effect.8 3 A positive HIV test
result would devastate most individuals, and some undoubtedly would
view a positive test as a death sentence regardless of its veracity.84 Sim-
ilarly, the recipient of a false negative test result might interpret incor-
rectly the result as a clean bill of health. Despite the potential for error
in every testing procedure, most people are likely to interpret the test
results as definitive.8 5
The potential benefits of organizing a broad mandatory HIV test-
ing program for any segment of the population at this time are uncer-
tain." In addition to the individual psychological damage a positive
817HIV test result may cause, a wide range of societal costs inevitably
will accompany positive test results. Because HIV predominantly has
affected groups that traditionally are targets of social and economic dis-
crimination, any mandatory testing program may subject individuals
who have tested positive to considerable stigmatization. 8 Because of
79. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 442.
80. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 265.
81. See, e.g., Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 263; Note, Constitutional Ques-
tions, supra note 16, at 443; Thomas, supra note 52, at 42 (stating that "[i]t is axiomatic in labora-
tory testing that when large numbers of low-risk people are tested for anything, the numbers of
false positive results increase").
82. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 264. It is unclear whether sex offenders, as a
group, constitute a high- or low-risk population. There is some indication that individuals who
commit sex crimes may be at a higher risk for HIV infection than most other segments of the
population. See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
83. See Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 265-66.
84. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 444.
85. Barry, Cleary & Fineberg, supra note 40, at 266.
86. See id. at 265.
87. Such psychological damage may include severe stress, depression, and even possible con-
templation of suicide. Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 213-14, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988).
88. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 443. A New York court stated, "A
person who has been involuntarily tested for AIDS and receives a positive result may suffer a
number of possible injuries. Perhaps first ... among these is the danger of stigmatization and
1616 [Vol. 43:1607
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the significant possibility of error in interpreting the test results,
mandatory screening for HIV is even more questionable.
Some commentators have suggested that researchers desperately
need to undertake a thorough evaluation of the HIV testing process89
and also that problems inherent in the current system should preclude
the use of available testing procedures for mandatory screening pur-
poses.9 Meanwhile, the calls for mandatory testing of various groups
continue unabated. A number of state legislatures have acceded to the
demands made on behalf of rape victims by providing for the testing of
accused rapists."1 The question remains whether these legislative ac-
tions actually combat the AIDS crisis in general and protect the rape
victim's interests in particular, or whether the measures serve only to
heighten existing fears and violate the rights of certain members of
society.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MANDATORY AIDS TESTING:
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE
Most governmental responses to the AIDS crisis, including
mandatory HIV testing of sex offenders, will set the government's
power and duty to protect the public health against the individual's
constitutionally guaranteed liberty interests.2 An epidemic disease such
as AIDS, which is both infectious and characteristically lethal, would
seem to justify the exercise of the government's power to enforce laws
designed to curb its spread. 3 Some well-intentioned state actions, how-
ever, may exceed constitutional boundaries.9 4 A mandatory HIV testing
law undoubtedly will interfere with the individual's right of privacy.
Foremost among constitutional limits on the government's power to in-
ostracism which may result." Doe, 139 Misc. 2d at 213, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
89. Thomas, supra note 52, at 40.
90. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 443. These tests may be acceptable as
screening devices when test subjects voluntarily consent to the testing and are counseled regarding
the possibility of false positive or negative results. See id. at 443-44.
91. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 38 (stating that HIV testing may be required in Arkansas
and Idaho upon the filing of sex offense charges).
92. Dolgin, AIDS: Social Meanings and Legal Ramifications, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 193, 202
(1985). Various groups of individuals have been designated to undergo mandatory testing for HIV.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In addition, other governmental reactions to AIDS would
bear significant scrutiny as possible encroachments on constitutional rights, including potential
restrictions that would permit discrimination against HIV-infected employees and schoolchildren.
See Dolgin, supra, at 202. Ominously, the idea of quarantining AIDS victims as a viable method of
controlling the disease's spread has been discussed seriously in a number of influential forums. Id.
at 202-03 n.60. A quarantine program clearly would present troubling constitutional questions.




trude on the right to privacy is the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable search and seizure. 95 An examination of recent
rulings in this area will help identify the standards that must be met to
ensure the constitutionality of a mandatory AIDS testing statute.
The fourth amendment provides that "[tihe right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... ."96 In Katz v.
United States9 7 the Supreme Court stated that governmental action
that intrudes on an area in which a person has a subjective and reason-
able expectation of privacy constitutes a search under the fourth
amendment.9 8 The fourth amendment does not prohibit all searches
and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. 9 The reasonable-
ness of a search is determined by balancing the extent of a state's intru-
sion on an individual's privacy interests against the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests. 100
The Supreme Court has identified two primary categories of gov-
ernmental searches. A criminal search involves a bodily intrusion with
intent to discover and secure evidence to be used in a criminal proceed-
ing.'10 An administrative search is a governmental intrusion into a per-
son's body, home, or business to obtain information that can be used to
protect public health or to ensure compliance with state regulations.0 2
In the criminal context, the Court has demonstrated that a search's
reasonableness lies in following the procedures set out in the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment. 03 With few exceptions, a search or
seizure in a criminal case is not reasonable unless a magistrate first has
95. A mandatory AIDS testing policy may implicate at least two other areas in which the
government may be restrained from intruding on the individual. For a discussion of mandatory
HIV testing and the generalized right of privacy found by the Supreme Court in the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965), see Plowman v. United
States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627, 632-35 (E.D. Va. 1988); Dolgin, supra note 92, at 203
n.61; Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 461-64. For an analysis of epidemic disease
and the government's police power to enact reasonable regulations to preserve public health,
safety, morals, and welfare, see Dolgin, supra note 92, at 204-07, and Note, Constitutional Ques-
tions, supra note 16, at 464-67.
96. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).
97. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
98. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
99. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989).
100. Id.; see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 534 (1967) (stating that the
basic purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect an individual's privacy against arbitrary inva-
sions by government officials and applying the same balancing test in the context of a warrantless
search).
101. Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1423; see also Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
102. Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1423; see Camara, 387 U.S. at 523.
103. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414. The warrant clause states that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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issued a judicial warrant based on probable cause. 04 For a search war-
rant to issue in a criminal context, there must be probable cause to
believe that a crime has been or is being committed. 10 5 Conversely, if
the search is deemed administrative, warrants to inspect premises or
persons are issued when there are reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards that authorize these intrusions. 10 6 Furthermore, some cir-
cumstances will justify a warrantless administrative search.' Thus, the
standards that authorize criminal and administrative searches differ
and perhaps are less rigorous in the latter. Whether a search of an indi-
vidual's blood is reasonable, therefore, depends on whether the search is
criminal or administrative in nature.10 8
A. Standards Governing Criminal Searches Under the Fourth
Amendment
In Schmerber v. California°9 the Supreme Court held that compul-
sory administration of a blood test is a search under the fourth amend-
ment.110 While the Court determined that the police investigation of a
vehicular homicide had provided probable cause to believe that the de-
fendant had been driving while intoxicated, the defendant's blood alco-
hol test was conducted without a warrant."' The Court held, however,
that under these circumstances a warrantless search was reasonable be-
cause the evidence of drunk driving would have been lost by the time
the police had obtained a search warrant."' Therefore, promotion of a
legitimate governmental interest outweighed the intrusion into the de-
fendant's privacy.
Schmerber demonstrates that if the test of an individual's blood is
intended to discover and secure evidence for use in a criminal proceed-
ing, the government must obtain a search warrant founded on probable
cause that the test will yield evidence of a crime unless a time delay
would result in loss of the evidence altogether." 3 Schmerber and its
progeny," 4 however, shed little light on the reasonableness of a blood
104. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414.
105. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534; Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1424.
106. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
107. See Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1424; see also infra notes 124-64
and accompanying text.
108. Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1424.
109. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
110. Id. at 767.
111. Id. at 768-69 & n.12.
112. Id. at 770-71; see also Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1425 (noting
that the alcohol "would have dissipated from the defendant's blood before a search warrant could
have been obtained").
113. Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1427.
114. In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), the Court refused to authorize removal of a
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search in an administrative situation. Arguably, a program of
mandatory HIV testing of sex offenders represents a search that is more
administrative than criminal in nature. Because the primary purpose of
mandatory testing is to protect some element or segment of public
health and not to obtain evidence to be used in a criminal proceed-
ing, 1 ' one must look closely at the way in which the Court has devel-
oped its doctrine of administrative searches in order to fit mandatory
HIV testing for sex offenders within the fourth amendment framework.
B. Standards Governing Administrative Searches Under the Fourth
Amendment
1. Warranted Searches
In Camara v. Municipal Court"' the Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction, which was based on his refusal to allow state
health inspectors to conduct a warrantless search of his home for hous-
ing code violations."' The Court held that an administrative search
conducted to enforce state regulations in the public interest constitutes
a significant intrusion on fourth amendment interests. When performed
without a warrant, such a search lacks the necessary fourth amendment
safeguards."18 The Camara Court declared that an administrative
search would be reasonable only if performed on the basis of a warrant
that verifies the need for and delineates the scope of the search.11 9 The
Court did not impose criminal search standards for probable cause as a
requirement for obtaining an administrative warrant. Rather, the Court
sought to strike a balance between the public and private interests im-
plicated in an administrative search by holding that there is probable
bullet from the defendant's body that the Commonwealth of Virginia claimed would provide
strong evidence of the defendant's guilt. Because the surgery was dangerous to the defendant, the
intrusion was more severe than the one sanctioned in Schmerber. See id. at 761 & n.4. Further,
because the Commonwealth had substantial additional evidence that would convict the defendant,
the Court declared that the invasion of the defendant's body was unreasonable. Id. at 767.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02. The Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic recommended legislation that would make knowing, intentional
transmission of HIV a criminal offense. Presidential Commission, supra note 2, at 130. In this
respect, a mandatory HIV test of a sex offender could be seen as a criminal search under the
fourth amendment, since the government would be seeking evidence useful in a criminal proceed-
ing. A few states, including Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, and Nevada, have passed criminal statutes
specifically intended to cover intentional HIV transmission. Id. Furthermore, some states have
chosen to use a positive HIV test to increase sentences in sexual assault convictions when the
defendant was aware that he was HIV-infected at the time of the attack. Hoffman, supra note 4, at
39.
116. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 534.
119. Id. at 531-33 & n.10.
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cause to issue a warrant to inspect when "reasonable legislative or ad-
ministrative standards" mandate the inspection. 120
The probable cause standards for an administrative search are rela-
tively vague as compared with those required in the criminal context.
For example, the Camara Court found that the condition of the sur-
rounding area, the passage of time, and the nature of the premises to be
inspected are reasonable legislative standards upon which a search war-
rant can issue. 12 1 The Court did not demand that authorities have ex-
press knowledge of the premises' particular condition before requesting
a warrant.122 Legislative standards, however, must be rational and must
represent a valid public interest in order to provide probable cause to
issue a "suitably restricted" administrative search warrant.123
2. Warrantless Searches
Twenty years after Camara the Supreme Court modified its stance
on the issue of whether an administrative search could be reasonable if
conducted without a search warrant. In New York v. Burger124 the
Court expanded the scope of administrative searches to allow warrant-
less inspections in situations of special need: situations in which indi-
vidual privacy interests are weakened, and governmental interests are
concomitantly heightened. 12 In upholding a warrantless inspection of
an automobile junkyard, the Court determined that closely regulated
industries subjected to substantial governmental oversight have a low-
ered expectation of privacy. 26
The Burger majority stated that a warrantless inspection may be
reasonable under the fourth amendment if three criteria are met. First,
following the Camara rationale, 2 7 the government must demonstrate
that a substantial state interest justifies the regulatory scheme under
which the inspection is made. 128 Second, the warrantless inspection
must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme. 29 Finally, the
state's inspection program must be sufficiently certain and regular in its
application to serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
search warrant. 30 To satisfy this last requirement, the program of in-
120. Id. at 538.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 539.
124. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
125. Id. at 702.
126. Id. at 700.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
128. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 703.
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spection must alert a party to the possibility of being subject to a
search, and the search must be limited in time, place, and scope.'31
In Burger the Court did not discuss whether the three part reason-
ableness test would govern administrative searches of an individual's
body and body fluids, but two years later the Supreme Court consid-
ered this issue in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association.132
Finding that on-the-job intoxication is a significant problem in the rail-
road industry and that employees who abuse alcohol and drugs consti-
tute a serious threat to public safety, the Court upheld administrative
regulations mandating warrantless blood and urine tests of employees
who are involved in specified accidents. 133 As in Schmerber,13 4 the
Court confirmed that blood, urine, and breath tests are searches under
the fourth amendment. 135 Noting that a presumption in favor of a
search warrant issued upon a degree of individualized suspicion still ex-
ists, the Court observed that individualized suspicion is not a constitu-
tional requisite for every search.13 Instead, judicial review of the
railroad industry's drug testing program requires a balancing test simi-
lar to those applied in Camara137 and Burger.138
In Skinner the Court observed that special needs necessitated a
balancing of governmental and private interests and made warrant re-
quirements impracticable. 139 Here, as in Burger, the Court found that
the customary governmental regulation of the railroad industry had
weakened privacy interests and heightened governmental interests
thereby making a warrantless search constitutionally acceptable. 40 The
Court held that a substantial state interest in regulating the conduct of
railroad employees justified the regulatory program under which the
state administered toxicological tests.' 4'
131. Id.
132. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
133. Id. at 1407, 1421-22. The Federal Railroad Administration found that from 1972 to 1983
at least 21 significant train accidents involved drug or alcohol intoxication, and that these inci-
dents resulted in 25 fatalities, 61 injuries, and damage to property estimated at $19 million. Id. at
1407-08.
134. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
135. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1412-18.
136. Id. at 1417.
137. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
138. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
139. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414.
140. Id.; Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1430-31.
141. The Court remarked that the test regulations were intended to reduce or eliminate acci-
dents and other fatal incidents, and that the "governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the
traveling public and of the employees themselves plainly justifies prohibiting covered employees
from using alcohol or drugs on duty .... This interest also 'require[s] and justiffies] the exercise
of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed.'" Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987)).
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The Court further found that the warrantless inspection was neces-
sary to implement the regulatory scheme. 142 Because the regulations re-
lied principally on blood tests to evidence recent drug or alcohol use
prior to an accident, the Court determined that any delay in obtaining
a warrant would defeat the effectiveness of the blood assay because evi-
dence of drug or alcohol use deteriorates rapidly in the bloodstream. 14 3
Furthermore, although employees know that an accident will trigger
testing, the unpredictability of the occurrence of such an event en-
hances the deterrent effect of the penalties for the use of drugs or in-
toxicants."' Thus, the Skinner inspection program is regular enough in
application to further the underlying administrative scheme and to
alert the individual of the possibility of being subject to a suitably lim-
ited search. Because the government's interest in testing railroad em-
ployees outweighed the employees' justifiable expectations of privacy
under these circumstances, and because the Skinner warrantless inspec-
tion program met the Burger standards for such a scheme, the Court
found no fourth amendment violation. 145
The Court followed a similar analysis in National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab14 6 when upholding a suspicionless drug
testing program for any customs officers who carried firearms or who
directly participated in drug interdiction.'47 While holding that urine
testing for illicit drug use clearly implicates the fourth amendment,4 "
the Court determined that the realities of the workplace justify certain
physical intrusions that might be unreasonable in other situations. 49
Finding that customs employees perform a function which substantially
impacts public safety and welfare and that the safety of each employee
depends largely on each employee's fitness for the job, the Court stated
that these individuals should expect some inquiries that might be intru-
sive in other circumstances. 50 Certain forms of public employment, the
majority concluded, result in a diminished expectation of privacy even
with respect to intrusive physical searches.' 15 Ultimately, under these
circumstances the government has a compelling interest in ascertaining
the trustworthiness and fitness of its drug interdiction force that out-
142. See id. at 1421.
143. Id. at 1420-21; see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71.
144. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419-20.
145. Id. at 1418-21.
146. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
147. Id. at 1397.
148. Id. at 1390.
149. Id. at 1393.
150. Id. at 1394.
151. Id. at 1393.
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weighs individual privacy expectations." 2 Persuaded that the drug test-
ing program bore a close and substantial relation to the government's
goal'53 and that the regulation clearly informed the employee of the ra-
tionale and scope of the test,15 4 the Court applied the warrantless
search standards of Burger and resolved the balancing test between
public and private interests in the government's favor. 155
At least one commentator has contended that the Skinner and Von
Raab balancing test would apply to court-ordered HIV testing as well
as to drug testing.156 Under this rationale, involuntary HIV tests would
be permitted if the physical intrusion served a special governmental
need that outweighed the individual's expectation of privacy. 57 The
Supreme Court has yet to consider whether compulsory HIV testing
can meet that fourth amendment standard. 58 In Glover v. Eastern Ne-
braska Community Office of Retardation,'59 however, one federal court
considered a policy that mandated HIV testing as a condition of state
employment. 6 "
The Glover court considered the constitutionality of an agency pol-
icy that required certain employees who had extensive contact with
agency clients to undergo testing for HIV.16 ' The court found that al-
though the legislature might have enacted the policy to combat the
spread of HIV, evidence showed that the risk of HIV transmission be-
tween agency employees and clients was so insignificant that the policy
had no real effect in preventing the spread of HIV.6 2 The court, there-
fore, decided that the government's interests in providing a safe envi-
ronment for agency clients did not outweigh the employees' reasonable
expectation of privacy in their blood.'63 Repeating that the governmen-
tal intrusion must be reasonable in both inception and scope, the court
152. Id. at 1396.
153. Id. Presumably, the Court applied the Skinner deterrence rationale to the warrantless
urine testing in Von Raab. The majority remarked that the petitioner's claim that such testing is
ineffective and, therefore, not conducive to the regulatory scheme was unfounded because it is
extremely difficult for a drug user to alter the test results by avoiding use of the drug after the test
date is known. Id.
154. Id. at 1394.
155. Id. at 1396.
156. See CRIM. JusT. NEWSL., Apr. 17, 1989, at 3.
157. Id. (statement of Judge Mary C. Morgan).
158. Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1431.
159. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988).
160. The governing board of the Eastern Nebraska Human Services Agency had adopted a
policy that required certain employees to submit to mandatory testing for tuberculosis, hepatitis
B, and HIV. Id. at 244. In addition, the policy contained reporting and disclosure requirements for
employees who know or suspect they have one of the diseases or are treated for any of them. Id.
161. Id. at 247.
162. Id. at 249.
163. Id. at 250.
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held that the mandatory blood testing policy was not justified at its
inception and, therefore, was an unreasonable search in violation of the
fourth amendment.1 6 4
V. AN ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME FOR MANDATORY AIDS TESTING:
CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 96
On November 8, 1988, the California electorate approved an initia-
tive known as Proposition 96. Added as Chapter 1.20 to the California
Health and Safety Code,165 Proposition 96 enables victims of sexual
crimes as well as certain peace officers, firefighters, and emergency med-
ical personnel who have been assaulted in their official capacity to re-
quest HIV testing of their assailants.16 6 The Proposition 96 HIV test is
administrative in nature because the test is structured to gather infor-
mation that will be used to protect the public health, not as evidence in
a criminal proceeding.1 67 The HIV test is essentially a warrantless
search that may be analogized to the search upheld in Burger.6 It is
also similar in nature to the physically intrusive searches discussed in
Skinner 6' and Von Raab.17
0
Under Proposition 96 assault victims may petition the court for an
order authorizing compulsory HIV testing of an assailant charged with
either a sexual assault or with physical interference with the official du-
ties of a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical officer.17' Upon
such petition, the court will conduct a hearing to determine whether
probable cause exists to believe that a transfer of body fluids from the
defendant to the victim occurred during the assault or altercation.172
Upon finding probable cause, the court will order the defendant to un-
dergo HIV testing.17 3
Proposition 96 states that a licensed medical laboratory will con-
duct the HIV tests1 4 and that the results of the test will be disclosed to
the defendant, the requesting victim, and if the defendant is incarcer-
164. Id. The court commended the agency's adoption of a safety-oriented approach, but de-
termined that achieving the goal could not overshadow the impermissible infringement on the per-
sonal liberty of the agency's employees. Id. at 251.
165. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.95-199.99 (West Supp. 1990).
166. Id. §§ 199.96-199.97.
167. Id. §§ 199.95, 199.98(f); see also Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1438.
168. 482 U.S. 691 (1987); see also Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1438.
169. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); see supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
170. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); see supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
171. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.96-199.97 (West Supp. 1990).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Proposition 96 specifies that participating laboratories will conduct tests for "medically
accepted indications of exposure to or infection by" HIV. Id. § 199.98(b). Presumably, this lan-
guage refers to the testing procedures discussed supra at notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
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ated, the incarcerating facility.1 75 A disclaimer informing the recipient
that the test may be inaccurate accompanies the results. 17 Test results
which indicate that the defendant has been exposed to or is infected
with HIV also will be transmitted to the California State Department of
Health Services. 177
Proposition 96 provides that anyone who receives information of
the defendant's test results under the statute must maintain the confi-
dentiality of any personal identifying data relating to the test results
except for disclosure necessary to obtain medical or psychological
care. 7  Any person who discloses test results pursuant to a statutory
authorization is immune from civil liability. 179 Finally, no test results
obtained pursuant to the statute are admissible as evidence in any
criminal or juvenile proceeding.8 0
Proposition 96 is deceptive because it uses the term "probable
cause" to justify a search of an individual's blood. This term seems to
suggest that the statute authorizes a criminal search. The statute, how-
ever, does not authorize a court to issue a testing order based on proba-
ble cause to believe that a crime has been committed, but instead on
probable cause to believe that there has been an exchange of body
fluids between defendant and victim.'8 ' The question is whether this
standard establishes a sufficiently articulated legislative scheme that
makes the mandatory AIDS test a constitutionally legitimate warrant-
less administrative search. 82 In other words, Proposition 96 must con-
form to the criteria set out in Burger and utilized in Skinner and Von
Raab in order for its compulsory HIV testing to be a valid administra-
175. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.96-199.97 (West Supp. 1990). Disclosure to the in-
carcerating facility entails disclosure only to the officer in charge and the chief medical officer of
the facility. Id. If the requesting victim is a peace officer, a firefighter, or an emergency medical
technician, the statute also requires disclosure of test results to the victim's employing entity. Id. §
199.97. Finally, if the defendant is a minor, the test results will be communicated to the minor's
parents or guardian. Id. § 199.98(d).
176. The disclaimer states: "The tests were conducted in a medically approved manner but
tests cannot determine exposure to or infection by AIDS . . . with absolute accuracy. Persons
receiving this test result should continue to monitor their own health and should consult a physi-
cian as appropriate." Id. § 199.98(d).
177. Id. § 199.98(c).
178. Id. § 199.98(e).
179. Id. § 199.98(g).
180. Id. § 199.98(f).
181. Id. §§ 199.96-199.97. Proposition 96 does not require that the court issue a formal search
warrant in order to inspect the defendant's blood. The court's only role in the inspection process is
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that there was an exchange of body fluids
between defendant and victim, i.e., that the administrative standards authorizing the search have
been met. Thus, the intrusion here is analogous to the warrantless search in New York v. Burger.
Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1438.




For a mandatory HIV test to be valid under the fourth amend-
ment, the government's interest in conducting the test must outweigh
the individual's expectation of privacy in his or her own blood. 183 If the
government constitutionally can utilize blood tests for employment pur-
poses, for ascertaining a driver's blood alcohol level, and for determin-
ing fitness for military service, the underlying safety rationale
conceivably could be expanded to include testing of persons charged
with a crime in order to provide their victims with information relevant
to the victims' health. 84 Under such circumstances, the defendant ar-
guably has a limited expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, the state has a substantial and perhaps compelling
interest in curbing the transmission of HIV and in protecting crime vic-
tims. 8 5 The state's interest is reflected in the purpose of the regulatory
program, which is to acquire vital information and to disclose it as nec-
essary to allow interested parties to take precautions, or alternatively,
to relieve the parties from groundless fear of contracting the virus.' s6
Arguably, the inspection authorized in Proposition 96 furthers the regu-
latory scheme contemplated in the statute: the mandatory test purports
to be an effective way of achieving the statute's stated goal. The ques-
tion is whether the inspection scheme is necessary to further the regula-
tory scheme. Finally, because the statute alerts the individual to the
timing, manner, and scope of the mandatory HIV test, the inspection
program appears to be sufficiently regular in its application to provide a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a search warrant. If a court
were to consider Proposition 96 under the criteria governing the consti-
tutionality of administrative searches, it appears that the statute could
survive fourth amendment scrutiny.18 7
VI. THE NEW YORK AIDS TESTING AND CONFIDENTIALITY LAW: A
DECISION NOT TO TEST?
As noted, New York State chose to promulgate a statute that does
not authorize mandatory HIV testing for sex offenders. 88 New York de-
ferred to individual privacy by enacting Article 27-F of its Public
Health Law, known as the New York AIDS Testing and Confidentiality
Law. 89 By prohibiting compulsory HIV testing and protecting the con-
183. Id. at 1439 & n.230.
184. Id. at 1443.
185. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.95 (West Supp. 1990).
186. Id.
187. Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing, supra note 3, at 1445.
188. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
189. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-2787 (McKinney Supp. 1990); see also Executive Sum-
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fidentiality of legally obtained test results, the law will have a profound
impact on the extent to which mandatory AIDS testing may be used in
the state criminal justice system.' 90 Interestingly, however, the New
York law contains a gap that seems to remove some of its contemplated
protections, notably for defendants in sexual assault cases. 191
The law generally regulates HIV testing and counseling proce-
dures.192 Specifically, it imposes a prohibition against HIV testing with-
out the test subject's written, voluntary, and informed consent. 93 When
communicating the results of a voluntary AIDS test, the disclosing
party must provide the test subject with counseling or referrals for
counseling in order to help the subject handle the possible ramifications
of the test results.' The law generally forbids disclosure of HIV-re-
lated information without an individual's informed consent, 95 except
for disclosure to the individual, certain health care facilities, public
health and welfare agencies and their officers, authorized insurance in-
stitutions, and specified individuals connected with the state correc-
tional system. 9 6 Section 2785 of the law states that a court may order
disclosure of confidential HIV-related information only when there is a
"compelling need" to disclose such information for the adjudication of a
proceeding or when there is a "clear and imminent danger" to an indi-
vidual due to contact with the individual to whom the information per-
mary, supra note 14, at 609.
190. Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 609. For example, state correctional facilities will
be required to comply with the mandate of the law. Id. at 609-12.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 199-203.
192. Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 609-11.
193. The statute states:
[N]o person shall order the performance of an HIV related test without first receiving the
written, informed consent of the subject of the test who has capacity to consent or, when the
subject lacks capacity to consent, of a person authorized pursuant to law to consent to health
care for such individual.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2781(1) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
Informed consent is evidenced under the law by the subject's signature on a form that ex-
plains, among other things, the purpose of the test, the benefits of early diagnosis and medical
intervention, the possibility of withdrawing consent, and the built-in confidentiality protections of
the law. Id. § 2781(2). Prior to obtaining written consent, the law requires that the test subject be
apprised of information regarding HIV transmission, the nature of HIV-related illness, and poten-
tial discrimination due to disclosure of test results. Id. § 2781(3).
194. Id. § 2781(5).
195. In passing these statutes, the legislature remarked that "maximum confidentiality pro-
tection for information related to [HIV] infection and [AIDS] is an essential public health measure
.... [T]he state has an interest both in assuring that HIV related information is not improperly
disclosed and in having clear and certain rules for the disclosure of such information." Id. § 2780
(historical note) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
196. Id. § 2782(1). A separate subdivision of the law's confidentiality and disclosure section
contains an in-depth discussion of the circumstances under which a physician is authorized to
communicate a subject's HIV test results to other individuals. See id. § 2782(4).
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tains.197 Finally, the statute stipulates that any person who violates the
prohibition against compulsory HIV testing or unauthorized disclosure
of the results of a voluntary test is subject to a civil penalty, and any
willful violator of the law will be guilty of a misdemeanor." 8
The New York AIDS Testing and Confidentiality Law forbids any
"person" from mandating an involuntary HIV test or disclosing the in-
formation obtained through a consensual test. 9 Significantly, however,
state and federal courts are not included under the statute's definition
of the term "person."200 Thus, at least one commentator has suggested
that the law's general prohibition against nonconsensual testing and
disclosure of such test results may not apply to the courts.20 '
With this in mind, a court could order, at its own discretion, a
criminal defendant to submit to a mandatory HIV test. This apparent
gap in the law's coverage, however, is arguably contrary to the spirit
and purpose of the law, which is intended to protect individual privacy.
The legislature stated that it intended that courts strictly construe the
few exceptions to the confidentiality rule.20 2 By analogy, the legislature
presumably also intended its general prohibition against nonconsensual
testing to be construed similarly; however, the New York law appears to
leave the door open for judges to order involuntary testing.
New York courts have not tested the scope of the AIDS Testing
and Confidentiality Law, but a court conceivably could decide that the
law does not disallow a judicially ordered test. One New York judge has
promised that he will challenge the law the next time a rape victim
requests that a defendant undergo HIV testing.203 Because New York
has no administrative scheme to regulate involuntary testing, it is ques-
tionable whether this action could survive fourth amendment scrutiny.
VII. THE VICTIM VERSUS THE DEFENDANT: WHOSE INTERESTS PREVAIL?
The government has a definite interest in responding to the con-
cerns of the rape victim in light of the AIDS crisis. In general, the gov-
ernment's position has been that victims of sexual assault deserve
consideration and support.20 4 The state also has recognized, however,
197. Id. § 2785. Note that this authorized disclosure pertains only to information obtained
with the test subject's informed consent.
198. Id. § 2783.
199. Id. §§ 2781-2782. As defined in the statute, a "person" includes any "natural person,
partnership, association, joint venture, trust, public or private corporation, or state or local govern-
ment agency." Id. § 2780(11).
200. See Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 610.
201. See id.
202. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2780 (historical note) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
203. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 41 (statement of Judge Nicholas Colabella).
204. Presidential Commission, supra note 2, at 131.
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that while the rape victim has the right to be treated with fairness and
dignity, a victim's request must be balanced against the constitutional
rights of the alleged sex offender.20 5 To the victim, this is a frustrating
proposition. Many victims of sexual assault wonder why the govern-
ment is sometimes more sensitive to issues of privacy and confidential-
ity than to public health.2 °0 Unquestionably, a rape victim has difficulty
believing that testing the rapist is a terrible invasion of his privacy.207
Victims' rights advocates argue that the purpose of testing alleged
sex offenders for HIV is to protect the victim's health and peace of
mind and to reduce further spread of the AIDS virus. 0 s In broad terms,
it is a question of public health. A potential risk for HIV transmission
in a sexual assault undoubtedly does exist and cannot be dismissed
readily. 20 9 Research, however, has not established the extent of the vic-
tim's risk. 10
HIV can be transmitted both homosexually and heterosexually. 211
The physical trauma associated with sexual assault serves to increase
the vulnerability of body tissue so that the risk of infection rises com-
mensurately. 212 In addition, the high-risk behavior of some sexual of-
fenders may make HIV transmission during a sexual assault an even
greater possibility.21 3 Studies have indicated that sexual offenders often
have relatively large numbers of victims and high rates of recidivism:
even a limited number of HIV-infected offenders potentially could
205. Id.
206. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 38.
207. See id. Furthermore, prior to enacting the AIDS Testing and Confidentiality Law, New
York policy appeared to permit compulsory testing of certain sex offenders. In People v. Thomas,
139 Misc. 2d 1072, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Co. Ct. 1988), the court determined that a defendant who
pleaded guilty to attempted rape could be ordered to undergo an AIDS test at the victim's request
and that the test was reasonable and proper. Balancing the "equities" of the circumstances, the
court held that it had the discretionary power to compel the test "simply because it [was] the
intelligent, humane, logical, and proper course of action" in this situation. Id. at 1074-75, 529
N.Y.S.2d at 431; see also People v. Cook, 143 A.D.2d 486, 532 N.Y.S.2d 940 (App. Div. 1988)
(maintaining that the constitutional rights of a defendant who pleaded guilty to rape were not
violated by a court-ordered HIV test conducted at the victim's request).
208. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.95 (West Supp. 1990).
209. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 36.
210. No reported and verified case of HIV contracted in a sexual assault has been docu-
mented to date. Id. Some commentators, however, have suggested that these cases exist, but have
not yet been identified. See id. Compounding the problem is the fact that rape is a vastly underre-
ported crime with some estimates indicating that for each reported rape, three to ten remain unre-
ported. Presidential Commission, supra note 2, at 131. Furthermore, much time can elapse before
HIV exposure is detectable, thereby making identification of the source more difficult. Hoffman,
supra note 4, at 36; see also supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
211. Merritt, supra note 12, at 748.
212. Presidential Commission, supra note 2, at 131; Hoffman, supra note 4, at 36.
213. Presidential Commission, supra note 2, at 131.
1630
MANDATORY AIDS TESTING 1631
transmit the virus to a considerable number of victims.2 14
If a rapist has spent time in jail, the possibility that he carries the
virus and, therefore, can infect his victim, is even greater.215 A substan-
tial percentage of inmates engage in conduct and practices that put
them at high risk for contracting HIV, and conditions at most state and
federal prisons exacerbate this problem. 6 Prison inmates are approxi-
mately twice as likely to have used illegal drugs as persons in the gen-
eral public.21 In New York alone sixty percent of prison inmates have
used intravenous drugs s.21  Nearly thirty percent of the United States
prison population engages in homosexual acts while incarcerated; it is
estimated that approximately nine to twenty percent of inmates are the
targets of nonconsensual sex acts while in prison. 19
These frightening statistics suggest a strong possibility of HIV
transmission in a sexual assault. Consequently, it is not surprising that
some legislators contend that any information with respect to an assail-
ant's HIV status is valuable to the rape victim-not only for the vic-
tim's protection, but also for those with whom the victim has intimate
contact.2 0 Yet others argue that knowledge of the defendant's HIV
status is of minimal use to the victim221 primarily because of the vagar-
ies of HIV incubation and test reliability.22 2 For example, if a defend-
ant's test result is negative, it may be a false negative result due to the
window of time between HIV infection and a positive test result. 223 In
214. Id. at 132; Hoffman, supra note 4, at 36.
215. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 36. Since 1984 AIDS has been the foremost cause of death in
the correctional system and has been responsible for greater than 50% of inmate mortality in New
York state prisons. Id.
216. Note, In Prison with AIDS: The Constitutionality of Mass Screening and Segregation
Policies, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 152 (1988) [hereinafter Note, In Prison with AIDS]. Seventeen
percent of the New York state prison population-approximately 7000 individuals-may be HIV-
infected. Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 603. Approximately 10,000 to 15,000 of the in-
mates who passed through the New York City prison system in 1988 carry the AIDS virus. Id.
217. Note, In Prison with AIDS, supra note 216, at 152 n.13.
218. Id. Incredibly, it is estimated that fully half of the 100,000 people who move through the
New York City prison system annually are present or former intravenous drug users. Id.
219. Id. at 152 n.14.
220. See Dunne & Serio, Confidentiality: An Integral Component of AIDS Public Policy, 7
ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 25, 28 (1988); Hoffman, supra note 4, at 38. Presumably, a sexual assault
victim whose assailant tested positive would abstain from further sexual contact or engage only in
"safe" sexual practices in order to protect other individuals. Despite efforts to protect the assault
victim, no conclusive evidence has suggested that any "maintenance" treatment will prevent an
individual exposed to HIV from developing full-blown AIDS. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 41.
Some preliminary research, however, has suggested that HIV-positive but symptomless individuals
may develop fewer drug-resistant strains of the virus while under AZT treatment. USA Today,
Jan. 30, 1990, at D1, col. 1; see also The Boston Globe, June 22, 1990, at 57, col. 1. Thus, a sexual
assault victim may derive some benefit from early notification of the attacker's HIV status.
221. CRIM. JusT. NEWSL., supra note 156, at 3 (statement of Judge Mary C. Morgan).
222. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 36; see also supra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
223. CRiM. JusT. NEWSL., supra note 156, at 3.
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this scenario a victim might be given a false sense of security.22 4 Simi-
larly, a defendant's test result might be false positive 225 thus causing
the victim to suffer needless mental anguish.
Even if the defendant's test result is a true positive, this informa-
tion may be of little use to the rape victim. If HIV antibodies are not
currently detectable until six weeks to eighteen months after infection,
determining when the defendant actually became infected is nearly im-
possible.226 Thus, a perpetrator who carries the virus at the time he is
tested could have been infected before he attacked the victim, at some
point during the time between the attack and his arrest, or in jail await-
ing trial.22 7 Those who argue against mandatory testing because of the
inaccuracy of the testing process contend that the best way to protect
the interests of the rape victim is to concentrate on testing, retesting,
and counseling the victim. 228
Given the problems inherent in the HIV testing procedure, the de-
fendant may have an expectation of privacy in his blood that would
invalidate mandatory HIV testing. The government's interest in pro-
tecting victims of sexual assault is substantial, but it may not be well
served by a program of mandatory, nonconsensual HIV testing of al-
leged sex offenders. Under Burger, Skinner, and Von Raab, a warrant-
less inspection will not be reasonable under the fourth amendment
unless necessary to serve a special governmental need that outweighs
the individual's privacy interest. If involuntary testing does not serve
adequately the governmental need to provide real protection to rape
victims, laws allowing mandatory testing will permit an unnecessary
and unproductive invasion into the personal privacy of defendants.229
Such testing would violate defendants' rights against unreasonable
search and seizure. The information thereby obtained could have a
profound effect on their constitutional and civil rights.
The defendant's privacy interest in not being tested for HIV invol-
untarily is substantial, primarily because of the inherent difficulty in
keeping test results confidential and also because of the frequent dis-
crimination against individuals known or thought to be HIV-positive.23 °
Confidentiality of HIV-related information is essential to protect indi-
viduals who test positive against discrimination in the workplace, in
224. Id.
225. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
226. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 38.
227. Id.
228. Id.; CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., supra note 156, at 3 (statement of Judge Mary C. Morgan).
229. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 36.
230. CalM. JUST. NEWSL., supra note 156, at 3.
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housing, and in the schools. 23' Supporters of mandatory testing gener-
ally recognize the need for confidentiality and strive to maintain a care-
ful balance between confidentiality of HIV information and protection
of the public health.3 2 Opponents of nonconsensual testing, however,
stress that policing confidentiality is a formidable task. Public debate
over mandatory HIV testing frequently has focused on the adequacy of
protection that current state confidentiality laws afford individuals who
are tested for HIV.233 Some states, like California, have enacted HIV-
specific laws that seek to strike a workable balance between confidenti-
ality and public health needs, but skeptics remain dubious. Critics
claim that simply too many opportunities for improper dissemination of
HIV test results exist even if a statute, such as California's Proposition
96, restricts disclosure to certain named parties and penalizes breaches
of confidentiality.234
The privacy and confidentiality concerns of the incarcerated de-
fendant may be even greater than those of most individuals subject to
an HIV test. Given the fact that inmates are undoubtedly aware of the
prevalence of HIV infection in the corrections system but suffer a lack
of independent information regarding viral transmission, they are often
overzealous in their own efforts to contain its spread.2 3' From the in-
mate's point of view, he is better off if he is not tested.236
Prisoners' rights advocates point out that when an inmate is tested
the results, positive or negative, are placed in his permanent record.237
Keeping this information confidential in a correctional facility is practi-
cally impossible.2 38 Any real or even rumored HIV infection could lead
to discrimination, intimidation, or even violence among the prison
population.3 9
An additional concern for defendants is whether a mandatory HIV
231. Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 611; Thomas, supra note 52, at 44.
232. See, e.g., Presidential Commission, supra note 2, at 126.
233. Dunne & Serio, supra note 220, at 28.
234. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 39. Interestingly, Proposition 96 does not penalize the
rape victim who discloses the defendant's test results to anyone for the purpose of obtaining medi-
cal or psychological care or advice. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 178 & 179. Allowing
disclosure for "medical or psychological care or advice" seems to allow for a broad range of com-
munication of test results thereby creating a possible loophole in the statute's confidentiality
protection.
235. Note, supra note 216, at 151.
236. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 39.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Note, supra note 216, at 171. For a lengthy treatment of the problems surrounding
AIDS testing and confidentiality in correctional facilities, see Branham, supra note 3, at 763, and




test might infringe on their rights to a fair and just trial. Some critics of
nonconsensual testing have voiced a concern that any involuntary test-
ing prior to conviction for a sexual offense turns the presumption of
innocence on its head.24 Knowledge of an involuntary test, performed
at the behest of the victim of the alleged offense, might cause a jury to
presume that the defendant actually committed the crime. Testing ad-
vocates may argue that a jury would not know that the test was per-
formed, but the mere rumor that a defendant's HIV status is in
question could have an adverse effect on the defendant's right to a fair
trial.24' Under some circumstances, a judge may take precautionary
measures when a defendant who is thought to be HIV-positive is pres-
ent in the courtroom. 242 Several of these measures would indicate to a
jury that the defendant may carry the AIDS virus. The defendant
thereby would be subject to considerable prejudice throughout the
court proceedings. 43
VIII. CONCLUSION
AIDS is a terrible, fatal disease, which thus far has eluded categori-
zation, treatment, and cure. It has occasioned discrimination and hyste-
ria among the ranks of society, 4 and it will continue to do so unless
society begins to deal with it in a rational, orderly manner. Unquestion-
ably, the government should be concerned with the safety of the rape
victim and of the public in general with respect to HIV transmission,
but it is presently unclear whether mandatory AIDS testing of sex of-
fenders offers society any tangible protection against the ravages of the
virus. In contrast, we must be alert to the fact that an involuntary test-
ing program may violate the test subject's rights under the fourth
amendment.
With proper counseling and confidentiality, the ELISA and West-
ern blot tests are effective procedures for those individuals who volun-
240. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 4, at 38 (statement of Judge Richard Andrias).
241. See Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 618.
242. See CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., supra note 156, at 3. For example, in 1988 the New York State
Office of Court Administration (OCA), which is not subject to the New York AIDS Testing and
Confidentiality Law, see supra note 196 and accompanying text, promulgated guidelines that allow
judges to seek a waiver of defendants' rights to be present at their own trials and also allow court
officers to employ certain precautions when a defendant is believed to have HIV infection. CRIM.
JUST. NEWSL., supra note 156, at 3. These precautions might include allowing court officers to wear
protective gloves and to guard defendants from a certain distance, notifying counsel and the jury
of the defendant's suspected HIV status, or removing the defendant from the courtroom. Id. For
an in-depth discussion of the OCA guidelines, see Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 616-20 &
n.30.
243. See Executive Summary, supra note 14, at 616.
244. Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 220-21, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
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tarily seek to ascertain their HIV status.245 These procedures, however,
do not appear sufficiently reliable to justify a mandatory HIV screening
scheme for sex offenders. As medical technology improves and as doc-
tors gain more knowledge of the disease, HIV testing someday may be-
come reliable enough to make involuntary testing an effective method
of curbing HIV transmission.
Following the reasonableness test set forth in Burger, the govern-
ment may conduct warrantless administrative searches in situations of
special need in which the governmental interest in protecting the public
safety and welfare significantly outweighs the individual privacy inter-
ests. To satisfy the Burger test the warrantless inspection must be nec-
essary to further the regulatory scheme. Because AIDS testing is
currently unreliable, involuntary testing may not serve the contem-
plated regulatory scheme. California's Proposition 96 attempts to make
mandatory testing of sex offenders fit into the Burger administrative
search category, but the statute may violate the fourth amendment be-
cause of the uncertainties surrounding AIDS testing.
To this point, New York has eschewed a mandatory AIDS testing
policy for alleged sex offenders in favor of a law that appears to provide
total protection for the defendant's privacy interests. Yet a loophole in
the statute could allow a court to compel a defendant to undergo HIV
testing. If California's administrative scheme for involuntary testing
cannot pass constitutional muster, a judge-ordered involuntary test is
even less likely to satisfy the strictures of the fourth amendment.
Ultimately, the constitutionality of involuntary HIV testing of sex
offenders rests on balancing the defendant's and the victim's respective
rights and interests. While the victim's interests are significant, noncon-
sensual testing of the alleged attacker may not benefit the victim or
society in general. Given the present status of HIV screening, testing
and retesting the victim, not the defendant, may serve the government's
interest most effectively. Additionally, the government could devote
needed resources to AIDS education and counseling.
When the reliability of AIDS testing improves, an administrative
scheme enabling nonconsensual testing of sex offenders will be more
likely to meet constitutional standards. Even the New York City Bar
Association, whose stern stance against involuntary testing of sex of-
fenders approximates that of the American Civil Liberties Union, has
noted that its position on the issue may change with time.246 For now,
245. Note, Constitutional Questions, supra note 16, at 443-44.
246. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 36.
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the test subject's privacy interests appear to be paramount. The gov-
ernment, and especially the court system, must be extremely wary of
attacks on fourth amendment rights made in the guise of health-related
AIDS claims. 47
Paul H. MacDonald
247. Doe, 139 Misc. 2d at 221, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
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